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Abstract
Prospective payment arrangements are now the main form of hospital funding in most developed countries. An
essential component of such arrangements is the classification system used to differentiate patients according to
their expected resource requirements. In this article we describe the evolution and structure of Healthcare Resource
Groups (HRGs) in England and the way in which costs are calculated for patients allocated to each HRG. We then
describe how payments are made, how policy has evolved to incentivise improvements in quality, and how prospective
payment is being applied outside hospital settings.
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Introduction
The diversity and complexity of hospital care makes it
challenging to devise reimbursement arrangements that
ensure that the amount and quality of hospital care
meets the needs of the population yet remains affordable.
Most countries have adopted some form of prospective
payment to encourage efficient provision of care, differen-
tiating payments using local variants of Diagnosis Related
Groups (DRGs) such as the Healthcare Resource Groups
(HRGs) used in England. In this article we describe the
evolution and structure of HRGs in England and the way
in which costs are calculated for patients allocated to each
HRG. We then explain how payments are made, how pol-
icy has evolved to incentivise improvements in quality and
how prospective payment is being applied outside hospital
settings.
Review
Development of the HRGs
The origins of HRGs can be traced back to 1981, when
the Department of Health commissioned research to assess
the ability of North American DRGs to explain variation in
the length of stay of English patients [1]. After a first refined
version of the US DRG system was created in 1987, the
United Kingdom’s own categorization system of HRGs was
launched in 1991 [1]. While DRGs were based on major
diagnostic categories (MDCs) that correspond to a single
organ system, HRGs are more directly related to specialties
(Table 1) and draw upon national procedure codes, devel-
oped by the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys
(OPCS),a in addition to the International Classification of
Diseases (ICD) codes for diagnoses.
The first version of HRGs comprised 534 categories
(including 12 ‘undefined’ categories: these reflect coding
quality issues, for example missing primary diagnosis or
age) but did not cover all acute activity, lacking groups
for psychiatry, radiotherapy and oncology [2]. HRG ver-
sion 2 was released in 1994, comprising 533 categories,
including six undefined (‘U’) groups, but now including
psychiatric HRGs. Further refinements led to the release
of HRG3.1 in 1997, comprising 572 groups and includ-
ing chemotherapy [3]. Another revision appeared with
the release of HRG3.5 in 2003, expanding the number of
groups to 610.
The HRG4 design represented a major development
from HRG3.5 in two key respects. First, under HRG3.5,
each episode of care generated a single core HRG. Under
HRG4, some high-cost elements of treatment were sepa-
rated from the core-HRG, generating ‘unbundled’ HRGs.
Unbundled HRGs capture eight broad types of specialised* Correspondence: katja.grasic@york.ac.uk
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careb that may be provided in different ways, in different
settings or by different providers [4]. Second, the number
of HRGs more than doubled, with coverage expanding to
include non-admitted (outpatient) care, emergency medi-
cine and some specialty areas not covered by HRG3.5,
such as critical care [5].
HRG4 was first used in the 2006/07 reference cost
collection exercise and replaced HRG3.5 as the basis
for reimbursement in 2009/10 [6].
HRG4 was designed to evolve year on year, but in
2012/13 a more extensive update, referred to as HRG4+,
provided even greater differentiation for complications
and co-morbidities [7]. The additional HRG codes were
mostly created by granulating existing HRGs into several
splits that better reflect complications and comorbidities
and are therefore more suitable for distinguishing cases
with high-resource use, reflected either by higher cost or
longer length of stay. HRG4+ is being introduced in
three phases from 2012/13, each phase involving refine-
ments to a subset of HRGs.
Use of HRGs
The application of the HRG system has evolved over
time [8]. When first introduced, HRGs were used for
benchmarking, providing the basis for comparative per-
formance assessment and commissioning. Hospitals
could use an interactive national database to compare
length of stay for their patients in an HRG against the
national average or against a selection of hospitals.
Subsequently, hospitals started to use HRGs for in-
ternal resource management, to monitor actual versus
expected expenditure, and to assess the budgetary im-
pact of anticipated changes in the volume and casemix
of patients within specialties or clinical directorates.
By the late 1990s, HRGs were being used for contractual
purposes. At that time hospitals received their income via
three main types of contractual arrangement. Block con-
tracts specified payment for a fixed volume of activity;
cost-and-volume contracts allowed for payments to be
withheld (or made) if volume levels were below (or sur-
passed) expectations; and cost-per-case contracts involved
patient-specific payments. Originally, contracts distin-
guished patients according to the specialty in which they
were treated but, from 1994 onward, increasingly more
contracts were specified using HRGs.
Announced by the Labour government in 1997, a
national schedule of ‘reference costs’ was developed
itemizing the cost of HRGs across the NHS [9].
Benchmarking costs in a standardized manner enabled
purchasers to identify cost inefficiency. However, with-
out information about case-mix and outcomes, the
provision of cost information alone was probably an
insufficient incentive for hospitals to take action to ad-
dress cost differentials [10].
In 2002, the Government published proposals to
introduce a prospective payment system, with hospitals
receiving a fixed national payment per patient depending
on the HRG to which they were allocated [11]. Payment by
Results (PbR)—as these reimbursement arrangements were
called—was introduced for a small number of HRGs in
2003/4, and coverage gradually expanded to other HRGs.
In 2013/14, PbR was superseded by the National Tariff
Payment System [12] which extended these prospective
payments beyond hospital care to NHS healthcare ser-
vices more generally [12]. Table 2 shows the evolution of
the HRG system, including changes in the numbers of
categories and scope.
Structure of HRG4+
HRGs are designed to be clinically similar and resource
homogeneous [2]. Several different approaches are in
use for the design and sense checks of the classification
system, among them (but not limited to) Classification
and Regression Trees (CART), Reduction in Variance
(RIV) and Minimum Volume Ellipsoid [13]. These
methods allow for identification of outliers and differenti-
ation between patients with high or low resource use. Pa-
tients are allocated to HRGs on the basis of information in
Table 1 HRG root structure
Chapter Chapter Description
A Nervous System
B Eyes and Periorbita
C Mouth Head Neck and Ears
D Respiratory System
E Cardiac Surgery and Primary Cardiac Conditions
F Digestive System
G Hepatobiliary and Pancreatic System
H Musculoskeletal System
J Skin, Breast and Burns
K Endocrine and Metabolic System
L Urinary Tract and Male Reproductive System
M Female Reproductive System
N Obstetrics
P Diseases of Childhood and Neonates
Q Vascular System
R Radiology and Nuclear Medicine
S Haematology, Chemotherapy, Radiotherapy and Specialist
Palliative Care
U Undefined Groups
V Multiple Trauma, Emergency Medicine and Rehabilitation
W Immunology, Infectious Diseases and other contacts with
Health Services
X Critical Care and High Cost Drugs
Source: National Casemix Office, 2014 [35]
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their electronic medical record using grouping software
[12], which is available online.c If any of the required data
fields are missing or invalid, the patient is allocated to an
‘error code’ HRG. The stages of the grouping algorithm
for HRG4+ are shown in Fig. 1.
Unbundling is the first step in the grouping process
[14], whereby some particular high cost procedures,
diagnostic imaging and high cost drugs are allocated to
separate ‘unbundled’ HRGs. The grouper then ignores
these unbundled components when deriving the core
HRG for each patient. Unbundling elements of ‘event-
based’ care from the core-HRG provides greater scope
for services to be provided in non-inpatient settings
where appropriate.
The second step involves identification of high-resource,
complex treatments associated with multiple trauma sites.
A patient is assigned a multiple trauma HRG if the treat-
ment involves at least two specific body sites.
The third step involves ranking procedures using a
hierarchy based on cost data and clinical knowledge.
Where several procedures are recorded, the procedure
with the highest hierarchy value determines the HRG al-
locations [15]. In case of multiple procedures with the
same hierarchy value, the one listed first in the medical
record is used for grouping. If procedures are planned
but not carried out, patients are allocated to a specific
HRG (WA14).
If no procedure with a hierarchy value of 5 or more is
recorded, the HRG is assigned using diagnosis hierarchies.
This follows the same steps as grouping using procedure
values.
Complication and comorbidity (CC) splits are a way of
incorporating variations in severity and complexity
within HRGs. Lists of CC splits are specific to each HRG
chapter and are usually based on diagnosis codes. Some
HRGs are also split by procedures, age, length of stay,
anatomical region or treatment approach. In HRG4+,
CC splits are based on the summed ‘score’ of all comor-
bidities present [15].
Each HRG4+ code is composed of five alphanumeric
characters (AANNA). The first letter represents one of 21
chapters and the second letter defines the sub-chapter,
narrowing down the treatment area (see Fig. 2). The next
two characters represent the number within the chapter/
sub-chapter; in general, lower numbers indicate higher
expected resource use [15]. The final letter defines the
split or level of severity within the HRG. Usual splits
are ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’, where ‘A’ is usually (but not always) an
indicator of greater resource use. The letter ‘Z’ indi-
cates that the HRG has no splits.
Table 2 Overview of the evolution of the English HRG system
1st DRG
version
2nd DRG
version
3rd DRG
version
4th DRG version 5th DRG version 6th DRG version
Date of
introduction
May 1992 August
1994
June 1997 October 2003 October 2006 Phase 1: April 2013
(Main) Purpose Patient
classification
Patient
classification
Patient
classification
Patient classification,
reimbursement
Patient classification,
reimbursement
Patient classification,
reimbursement
DRG system HRG1 HRG2 HRG3.1 HRG3.5 HRG4 HRG4+
Cost and/or
performance
data used for
development
Adaptation
of United
States DRGs
Data
analysis of
groupings
Clinical review
to refine for
ICD-10. Statistical
analysis
Clinical Working
Groups refined
categories.
Expert working groups’ Expert working groups, clinical
communities, as well as
international casemix
developments and best practice*
micro-costing data
Statistical analysis
Number of
DRGs
534 533 572 610 Updated annually: Updated annually:
1389 (2006/7) to 1657
(2011/12)
2100
Applied to Public
hospitals
Public
hospitals
Public hospitals Public hospitals/private
hospitals or treatment
centres treating NHS
patients
Public hospitals/private
hospitals or treatment
centres treating NHS
patients
Public/private hospitals or
treatment centres treating NHS
patients
Acute
admissions
Acute
admissions
Acute
admissions
Acute admissions Acute admissions Acute admissions
Outpatients Outpatients
Critical Care Accident and Emergency
Critical Care
*Developed in partnership with the clinical community, as represented and endorsed by the Royal Colleges Associations and Professional Bodies. The increased
applicability of the Casemix classification to emerging policy requirements has been influenced by findings from the Department of Health's International Review
of Classifications, as well as international casemix developments and best practice
Sources: Anthony, 1993 [2]; Benton, 1998 [3]; Casemix Design Authority, 2009 [4]; NHS Information Centre for Health and Social Care, 2008 [5]; Information
Standards Board for Health and Social Care, 2009 [6]; National Casemix Office, 2013 [7]; National Casemix Office, 2014 [35]
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Costing of HRGs
All NHS hospitals are required to report their activity
and unit costs annually to the Department of Health
[16]. The rules for costing are updated on a regular basis
and are summarised in Approved Costing Guidance [17].
Currently, the mandatory reporting of costs is using a
top-down approach, although efforts are in place to mo-
tivate providers to report their costs at patient level,
using Patient-Level Information and Costing Systems
(PLICS).
Top-down costing requires that unit costs reflect the
full cost of provision and include all operating expenses,
staff costs and capital costs (both interest and principal),
but exclude the costs of teaching and research. The
starting point for the top-down costing process is the
general ledger. Here, total costs or ‘high-level control totals’
are established. Aggregate costing figures are then divided
into one of three cost categories: direct, indirect and over-
heads. Direct costs are those which can be directly attrib-
uted to the service(s) that generated them. For instance,
Fig. 1 HRG4–Classification flow chart for inpatients. Sources: Code to Group Worksheet, HSCIC
H
• Musculoskeletal 
System
• HRG4 Chapter
• 21 different 
chapters
• Broad 
specialization of  
the area
B
• Orthopaedic 
Non-Trauma 
Procedures
• HRG4 
subchapter
• 50 different sub 
chapters
• More precise  
specialization of 
the area
1
• Major Hip 
Procedures for 
Non-Trauma, 
Category 2   
• Both numbers 
together define 
the group
• The higher the   
number, the  
greater the 
resurceu se
1
• Both numbers 
together define  
the group
A
• Major Hip 
Procedures for 
Non-Trauma, 
Category 2,  
with Major CC
• Split
• Defines the 
“seriousness” 
of the condition
• Most common 
values: A, B, C, 
Z
Fig. 2 Composition of HRG code HB11A (Major Hip Procedures for Non-Trauma, Category 2, with Major CC). Sources: Code to Group
Worksheet, HSCIC
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the type and amount of nursing staff working in a particular
specialty can be estimated with reasonable precision.
Costs that cannot be attributed directly must be ap-
portioned by other means. Indirect and overhead costs
are pooled in order to do this.d These ‘cost pools’ bring
together costs into identifiable groups (for example,
wards, pharmacies, theatres) which are then apportioned
to the relevant departments. These allocations take ac-
count of the fixed, semi-fixed or variablee nature of the
resource in question.
Fig. 3 illustrates stages of this costing exercise [16].
The next step involves allocations to treatment settings
(e.g. theatres, radiology) and specialities (e.g. urology,
general surgery). This allocation may be direct (e.g.
wages of nurses working on a particular ward) or indirect
(e.g. cleaning costs of theatres or wards). Costs are then
allocated according to the point of delivery, indicating
whether the patient was treated as a day case or as an
elective, non-elective or maternity inpatient, in an out-
patient (ambulatory) department, or in ‘other’ settings.f
Finally, costs are allocated to HRGs, taking account of
the volume of patients in each HRG in each setting and
key cost drivers including length of stay or the number
of prostheses used. The outcome of this cost-allocation
process is a cost per HRG according to the type of ad-
mission for each hospital specialty.
For each HRG there will be a small number of cases
which have an abnormally long length of stay. An upper
trim-point is calculated for each HRG: the upper quartile of
the length of stay distribution for that HRG plus 1.5 times
the interquartile range [18]. A cost per excess bed day is
calculated for patients that stay beyond the trim point.
Calculation of HRG prices and form of payments
Currently, most acute hospital care in England is reim-
bursed under the prospective payment system now termed
‘the National Tariff Payment System’ and administered by
Monitor, the independent regulator for health services [12].
In 2014/15, national tariffs were payable for most admitted
patient care, outpatient care and A&E services. However,
there remained scope for variation from national tariffs,
allowing commissioners and providers to agree local prices
for some types of activity, such as for high-cost drugs, mag-
netic resonance imaging (MRI) scans, cochlear implants,
orthopaedic prostheses and chemotherapy [12].
The national tariff is determined for the year ahead by
the Department of Health according to a standard meth-
odology [19]. Details of the tariffs for admitted patients,
outpatients and A&E attendances are summarized in
Table 3. Prices are set based on the average of the costs
calculated by all hospitals for each of their HRGs.
The base tariff for each HRG (i = 1… I) and admission
type (j = 1…5) for a given year t, pijt, is calculated as:
pijt ¼ πicijt−3 ð1Þ
$${p}_{ijt}={\pi}_i{\overline{c}}_{ijt-3}$$where cij
$${\overline{c}}_{ij}$$ is the average cost for each HRG
by admission type across all hospitals. There is a three-
yearg delay between hospitals submitting cost data and
these data being converted into prices, hence the t-3
subscript attached to these average costs. To take ac-
count of this delay, an adjustment πi is made to each
HRG. This adjustment is HRG-specific, allowing for in-
flationary impacts such as clinical guidance and technol-
ogy appraisals issued by the National Institute for Health
and Care Excellence (NICE) that may have occurred in
the intervening period and for improvements in effi-
ciency [21]. An efficiency factor of 3.8 % was set for
2015/16, and many hospitals initially rejected the
GENERAL LEDGER
Direct Indirect and Overhead
Cost pools
Wards WardPharmacies
Theatres Etc.
Treatment settings
Radiology Theatres Etc.
Specialities
Urology Gen. Surgery Etc.
Settings
Day cases Electives Etc.
HRG unit costs
HRG1 HRG2 Etc.
Fig. 3 English cost-accounting system. Sources: Department of Health,
2009 [24]; Healthcare Financial Management Association, 2012 [34]
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Table 3 Payment arrangements, 2014/15
Admitted patients Outpatients A&E Post discharge rehabilitation Unbundled HRGs
Currency HRG spell Treatment function code (TFC): attendance
by specialty
HRG Attendance Bed days Events
HRGs: for procedures
Structure Tariffs for: Tariffs for: Tariffs vary by: Tariffs for 4 types of post discharge
rehabilitation:
Chemotherapy
• electives & day cases • first attendance • Type of
investigation
• Cardiac • a core HRG (covering the primary
diagnosis or procedure) –national
price
• non-electives • follow-up attendance • Category of
treatment
• Pulmonary • unbundled HRGs for
chemotherapy drug
procurement—local currencies and
prices
• short-stay elective • multi-professional/single professional
appointments
• Provider type • Hip replacement • unbundled HRGs for chemotherapy
delivery—national prices
• short-stay emergencies (>2 days) • separate national prices for diagnostic
imaging
• Knee replacement Radiotherapy:
• Best practice tariffs Procedures carried out in outpatient setting
subject to non-mandatory tariff based on
HRGs
National prices to shift responsibility for
patient care following discharge to the acute
provider who treated the patient. Applicable
only where a single trust provides both acute
and community services.
• unbundled HRGs for planning and
treatment—national or local prices
• Pathway payments Non-mandatory tariff for outpatient
appointments not carried out face to face
o Maternity care
o Cystic fibrosis
Long-stay outlier payment
triggered at predetermined length
of stay (dependent on HRG).
Specialized
service
adjustments
Best practice tariffs for 17 types of
care
Local prices for outpatient attendances that
are not pre-booked or consultant-led.
Type 3 A&E
departments are
eligible for the
simplest currency
only
Top-up payment for specialized
services for children, spinal surgery,
neurosciences and orthopaedic
activity
NHS Walk-in Cen-
tres are paid by
local prices, not by
the tariff
Rules and
Flexibilities
Unbundling: see column 5 Unbundling of care pathway subject to
local agreement
Local flexibilities
could be applied to
support service
redesign
Emergency admissions: the
marginal rate emergency rule
Emergency readmissions: the
30 day emergency readmission rule
Sources: Monitor 2013 [12]; Department of Health, 2009 [24]
Note: Teaching and research are funded entirely separately, and their costs are not included in the national tariff. ‘Currency’ is the unit of payment
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proposed tariff arrangements [22]. After a period of ne-
gotiation between Monitor and hospitals, 88 % of hospi-
tals accepted the so-called enhanced tariff option (ETO)
for 2015/16. Those that did not continued to be paid on
the basis of 2014/15 tariffs.
HRG-specific per diem payments are made if patients
stay in hospital beyond HRG specific length of stay trim-
points. The excess bed day costs reported by hospitals
are used to calculate these payments.
While a single national tariff applies, it is recognised
that some costs relating to labour, land and buildings are
outside the control of hospitals. The overall impact of
these exogenous costs is corrected by the Market Forces
Factor (MFF).h In the past, the MFF was paid directly by
the Department of Health, but purchasers (clinical
commissioning groups, known as CCGs) now make the
MFF payments at the same time as activity payments [24].
Top-up payments are also made for specialised services,
in recognition that cost differences may not be adequately
captured by HRGs [25]. In 2014/15, specialist top-ups
were made for provision of specialised care for children
(top-up: 44 to 64 per cent), neurosciences (28 per cent),
and spinal surgery (32 per cent) and orthopaedics (24 per
cent) [12].
Finally, to incentivise lower rates of emergency admis-
sions and to encourage providers and commissioners to
work together to reduce the demand for emergency care,
acute hospitals are paid 30 per centi of the national tariff
for increases in the value of emergency admissions above
an agreed baseline [12]. Commissioners must spend the
remaining 70 per cent on managing demand for emer-
gency services.
The tariff system has driven the development of classifi-
cation systems for care delivered in non-hospital settings.
The scope of the payment system has been progressively
extended to cover adult mental health, long-term con-
ditions, preventative services, sexual health, community
services, ambulance services and out-of-hours primary
care [26]. The work on adult mental health is to be ex-
tended to cover psychological therapies (Improving Ac-
cess to Psychological Therapies-IAPT), children’s and
adolescent mental health, forensic mental health, learn-
ing disabilities and liaison psychiatry [12].
New currencies for palliative and end of life care
aim to describe differences in the complexity and cost
of patients in need of palliative care. The currencies
have been defined using data collected through 11
Palliative Care Funding Pilots that ran between July
2011 and April 2014 and have been in (non-
mandatory) use since 2015/16. Twenty-eight adult
and 28 children currencies are intended for use in acute,
community care and hospice setting and are built around
four phases of illness: stable, unstable, deteriorating and
dying [27].
Quality-related adjustments
From 2009/10, all acute trusts have been required to
publish ‘quality accounts’ alongside their financial accounts
[28]. The Commissioning for Quality and Innovation
(CQUIN) payment framework came into effect in April
2009. It allows commissioners to link a specific, modest
proportion of providers’ income to the achievement of real-
istic locally agreed goals. Examples of local goals set in
2012/13 include provision of smoking cessation support,
improvement of hospital discharge/clinical communication,
promotion of better responsiveness to personal needs
of patients and improvement of hospital food. The
CQUIN payment framework originally covered 0.5 per
cent of a provider’s annual contract income [29] and
this rose to 2.5 per cent in 2014/15 [30]. There are also
four national CQUINs, selected on a yearly basis that
aim to incentivise both quality and efficiency by creat-
ing new patterns of care; in 2014/15 they comprised pa-
tient experience (Friends and Family Test), dementia
and delirium care, reduction of harm (NHS Safety
Thermometer), and improving physical healthcare for
people with severe mental illness [30].
An important development is the introduction of ‘best
practice’ tariffs’ (BPTs) for high-volume areas that are
characterised by significant levels of unexplained variation
in quality of clinical practice and for which there is clear
evidence of what constitutes best practice [31]. The tariffs
reflect the costs of delivering best practice and are
intended to incentivise a shift away from ‘usual care’,
which is reimbursed by the standard HRG tariff. The se-
lection and development of BPTs depends on evidence of
variation in practice as well as on feasibility of collect-
ing high quality data. For example, the Institute for
Innovation and Improvement found that, in 2005/6, the
national average day case rate for cholecystectomies
was just 6.4 % and there were significant variations
across hospitals in the proportion of the procedures
undertaken laparoscopically, in length of stay and in
the day case rate. The optimal ‘pathway of care’ for chole-
cystectomy and recommendations for its delivery were then
designed based on a literature review, site visits, and semi-
structured interviews [32].
The impact of individual BPTs is variable and in
some cases BPTs were not themselves considered to be
the driving force for local improvement [32]. Never-
theless, some areas have shown significant improve-
ment; for example, only 37 % of eligible patients were
given the BPT uplift for hip fracture care at the begin-
ning of 2011 and this rose to 64 % in the last quarter
of 2013 [33].
Table 4 provides an overview of the development of
BPTs, including a ‘year of care’ capitation payment for
outpatient services in paediatric diabetes, and pathway
payments for maternity and cystic fibrosis services.
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There are plans to develop capitation payments for those
with long-term conditions, and new currencies for pal-
liative and end-of-life care [12].
Conclusions
Creating an efficient, fair and transparent funding model
for healthcare is a dynamic process, as it is influenced by
technological advancements, new policies and change in
population demographics. There have been several major
overhauls of the HRG system over the last three decades,
as well as annual revisions. In this article we have described
the evolution and structure of HRGs in England, the way in
which costs are calculated for patients allocated to each
HRG, and how HRGs underpin the prospective payment
system. HRGs have evolved from a means of classifying
activity, then to paying for activity, and to incentivizing
quality and better outcomes for patients, both within
and beyond hospital settings.
It is likely that HRGs will be further granulated to adjust
for the more difficult cases and in response to techno-
logical changes. This is already evident in the development
of the HRG4+ system, with new currencies added on a
yearly basis, covering a wide range of activities in different
settings. It is also likely that best practice tariffs will be
extended to other areas, so that payments become more
outcome-focused and not just activity-based. There may
also be greater interest in currencies based on care path-
ways, already introduced for mental health and palliative
care, as these potentially incentivise integrated care based
on patient need rather than incentivising activity. These
welcome directions of travel represent the next chal-
lenge for policy development and evaluation over the
coming decade.
Endnotes
aOPCS 4.7 was implemented in April 2014
Table 4 Introduction and development of best practice tariffs
2010/11 Cataracts Aims to reduce the number of times patients are assessed before and after surgery by
setting a price for the whole pathway rather than pricing each spell of activity; the pathway
should be in line with recommendations provided by Royal College of Ophthalmologists
Cholecystectomy (gall bladder removal) Encourages keyhole surgery in a day case setting where clinically appropriate
Fragility hip fracture Makes an additional payment for providing rapid surgery and orthogeriatric care
Stroke Makes additional payments for urgent brain imaging and care in an acute stroke unit.
2011/12 Adult renal dialysis Aims to improve care for patients undergoing haemodialysis
Day case procedures Encourages providers to increase their day case rates in a number of surgical procedures
including hernia repair and prostate resection; by 2014/15 fifteen high volume procedures
are included in the tariff.
Interventional radiology Incentivises use of minimally invasive techniques rather than open surgery where clinically
appropriate; in 2014/15 seven procedures are included in the Best Practice Tariff programme
Paediatric diabetes Aims to improve quality of diabetes care; from 2014 includes also inpatient stays for young
people with diabetes
Primary total hip and knee replacements Encourages best clinical management of patients and reductions in length of stay
Transient ischaemic attack (or mini-stroke) Paid for timely and effective outpatient systems for treating patients with TIA
2012/13 Major trauma Encourages best practice treatment and management of trauma patients within a regional
trauma network; in 2014/15 there was a change in best practice criteria
Same day emergency care Promotes management of 12 clinical scenarios on a same day basis in an ambulatory
emergency care manner
Procedures in outpatients Encourages three procedures (diagnostic cystoscopy, diagnostic hysteroscopy and
hysteroscopic sterilisation ) to be performed in an outpatient setting
Paediatric diabetes Applies to providers who provide services in accordance with the best practice specification
2013/14 Early inflammatory arthritis Services must meet four criteria, dealing with early referral and treatment start as well as
regular subsequent appointments
Endoscopy procedures Encourages providers to meet quality standards in line with the |Joint Advisory Group
accreditation scheme for endoscopy services.
Paediatric epilepsy Intended for follow up appointments
Parkinson’s disease Aims to reduce waiting time for treatment
Pleural effusions Applies to unilateral effusions and increasing use of thoracic ultrasound.
2014/15 Hip and knee replacement Payments linked to patient reported outcome measures (PROMs)
Sources: Department of Health, 2013 [18]; Monitor, 2013 [12]
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bChemotherapy; critical care; diagnostic imaging; high
cost drugs; radiotherapy; rehabilitation; specialist palliative
care; renal dialysis for acute kidney injury.
cThe Payment Grouper for 2014/15 is available from:
http://www.hscic.gov.uk/article/3938/HRG4-201415-Pay
ment-Grouper [previous years are available in the archive]
ddIndirect costs are indirectly related to the delivery of
patient care, but cannot always be specifically identified
to individual patients. Overhead costs are the costs of
support services that contribute to the effective running
of an NHS provider. These costs cannot be traced or
easily attributed to patients, and need to be allocated via
an appropriate cost driver [17].
eFixed costs are those that do not change as activity
changes (e.g. annual contract cost for cleaning services).
Semi-fixed costs are those that do not change with small
changes in activity but that ‘step up’ when a certain
threshold is reached (e.g. nursing staff ). Variables costs
are those that are directly affected by the number of pa-
tients treated or seen (e.g. drug costs) [17].
f ‘Other’ here refers to all other hospital costs that are
not part of day-case, inpatient or outpatient activity. It
includes community services, critical care services, A&E
medicine, radiotherapy and chemotherapy, renal dialysis,
and kidney and bone marrow transplantation, for example.
gPrior to the Lawlor review there was a two-year lag [20].
hFor a description of the methods for calculation of
Market Force Factors, see reference [23].
iFrom 2015/16: 70 % under the new enhanced tariff
option (ETO) https://www.england.nhs.uk/2015/03/06/
eto-2015-16/. This money, which would otherwise have
been spent by CCGs on admission avoidance measures,
is now available to providers to be invested in acute ser-
vices, including but not limited to winter resilience
schemes [2015/16 tariff arrangements FAQ)
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